I. To the Question

A. The Common Opinion

1. Exposition of the Opinion

14. The common statement is, yes [that Mary was conceived in original sin], because of the authorities taken up, and because of arguments from two middle terms:Vatican editors: Alexander of Hales, ST 3 n.75, “The blessed Virgin could not have been sanctified in her parents; on the contrary, it was necessary that she would contract sin from her parents in being generated;” n.76, “The blessed Virgin could not have been sanctified in her conception;” n.78, “The glorious Virgin was sanctified in her mother’s womb before her birth after infusion of soul in her body.” Albert the Great Sentences 3 d.3 a.4, “The blessed Virgin was not sanctified before animation; and to say the opposite is a heresy;” ad 1, “This statement is false: that the Holy Spirit preceded her soul in the body by sanctifying grace inhabiting the body;” a.5, “She was sanctified before birth from the womb^, more probably soon after animation.” Thomas Aquinas Sentences 3 d.3 a.1 a.1 q.2, “The sanctification of the blessed Virgin could not have fittingly been before the infusion of the soul, because she was not yet capable of grace; but nor even in the very instant of infusion, namely so that by the grace then infused in her she would have been preserved from incurring original guilt;” a.2 q.2 ad 3, “Christ’s Virgin Mother was indeed infected with original sin, but she was cleansed of it before she was born from the womb;” Quodlibet 6 q.5 a.1, “Now the blessed Virgin proceeded thus from Adam...and therefore she was conceived in original sin...The belief is... that she was sanctified quickly after conception and infusion of soul.” Bonaventure Sentences 3 d.3 p.1 a.1 q.2, “Now the position of others is that the sanctification of the Virgin was subsequent to the contraction of original sin...And this way of speaking is more common and more reasonable and more safe...Adhering to this position.let us hold.that the sanctification of the Virgin was after contraction of original sin.” Richard of Middleton Sentences 3 d.3 princ.1 q.1, “The soul.of the Virgin, from its union with the flesh, contracted original sin.” Giles of Rome Sentences 3 d.3 q.1 a.1, “We will say that she was conceived in original sin as are also other women, but it is piously believed that almost immediately after she was conceived in original sin she was cleansed of it and sanctified in the womb;” also Quodlibet 6 q.20. Many other authors too. ³⁸

One of these is the excellence of the Son himself;Vatican editors: John de la Rochelle Quaestiones Disputatae q.1, “If the blessed Virgin.does not have the guilt of sin she does not need redemption.She was redeemed by Christ; therefore she was conceived in sin.” Bonaventure Sentences 3 d.3 p.1 a.1 q.2 arg.5 in opp., “If then the blessed Virgin lacked original sin, it seems that she does not belong to the redemption of Christ; but there is great glory for Christ from the saints whom he has redeemed; therefore, if he did not redeem the blessed Virgin, he is deprived of the noblest glory.; this is a profane and impious thing to say.” Thomas Aquinas Sentences 3 d.3 q.1 a.1 qc.2, “Christ singly has this among the human race, that he does not need redemption, because he is our head but it belongs to all to be redeemed through him; but this could not be if any soul were found which had never been infected with the original stain; and therefore this was conceded neither to the Virgin nor to anyone else besides Christ;” Quodlibet 6 q.5 a.1; ST IIIa q.27 a.2, “If the blessed Virgin had not incurred the stain of original guilt.she would not have needed the redemption and salvation that comes through Christ.; but this is unacceptable, that Christ was not the savior of all men.” Bonaventure Sentences 3 d.3 p.1 a.1 q.2 arg.6 in opp., “Again, if the blessed Virgin did not have original sin, and if to none the door is closed save as desert for original sin, then it seems that, if she had died before Christ, she would at once have flown to heaven; therefore it does not seem that the door was opened to all by Christ.” ³⁹ for, as universal redeemer, he opened the door for everyone; but if blessed Mary had not contracted original sin she would not have needed a redeemer and her Son would not have opened the door for her, because it would not have been closed to her (for it is only closed because of sin, and especially original sin).a

a.a [Interpolation] Again Augustine in book 1 on the baptism of infants [On the Merits of Sinners 1.29 n.57] says, “Only Christ was born without sin [whom the Virgin conceived without male embrace].” Again in book 2 [ibid., 2.29 n.47] the same Augustine says that the barrier came through sin, and because of it men were excluded from the entrance of the heavenly fatherland, and the door was opened by the passion of Christ; therefore the blessed Virgin, if she had been without sin and had died before the passion of her Son, would have entered heaven, and so the door would not have been opened for all by Christ; consequently the blessed Virgin would not have needed the redemption of her Son.

15. The second middle term comes from what is evident in the blessed Virgin:Vatican editors: Bonaventure Sentences 3 d.3 p.1 a.1 q.2, “Being precedes well being; therefore the soul was first united to the flesh before the grace of God was infused in it... So it is necessary to posit that the infection of original guilt was there before sanctification was.” Thomas Aquinas Sentences 3 d.3 q.3 a.1 qc.1 and ad 1; Quodlibet 6 q.5 a1, “Now the blessed Virgin proceeded thus from Adam, because she was born from the commingling of the sexes, as others also are; and therefore she was conceived with original sin and is included in the totality of them, about which totality the Apostle says in Romans 5, ‘in whom all have sinned,’ and from this totality Christ alone is excepted;” ST IIIa q.27 a.2 ad 4. Also references in Richard of Middleton, Henry of Ghent, Giles of Rome. ⁴⁰ For she was propagated according to the common law and consequently her body was propagated by and formed from infected seed - and so the same idea of infection was in her body as is also in the body of anyone else propagated from the origin; and since the soul is infected by the infected body, the same idea of infection was in her soul as is also in the souls of others commonly propagated.

16. Likewise, she had the penalties common to human nature (as thirst, hunger, and the like), which are inflicted on us because of original sin;Vatican editors: Bonaventure Sentences 3 d.3 p.1 a.1 q.1, “Almost everyone holds that the blessed Virgin had original sin, since this is apparent from the manifold penalties in her, which one cannot say she suffered for the redemption of others, and which one cannot say she had by assuming them -but by contraction [of sin];” d.15 a.1 q.3 ad4. Thomas Aquinas ST IIIa 1.27 a.3 arg.1. ⁴¹ and these were not voluntarily taken up by her, because she was not our redeemer and repairer, for then her Son would not have been the general redeemer of all; therefore, they were inflicted on her by God - and not unjustly inflicted; therefore they were inflicted after sin, and thus she was not innocent.

2. Rejection of the Opinion

a. Against the First Reason

17. Against the first reason [n.14] the argument that she did not contract original sin is taken from the excellence of her Son - insofar as he was redeemer, reconciler, and mediator.

For the most perfect mediator has the most perfect act of mediating possible with respect to some person for whom he mediates;     therefore Christ had the most perfect degree of mediating possible with respect to some person with respect to whom he was mediator; but with respect to no person did he have a more excellent degree than with respect to Mary; therefore etc     .

18. But this would not be the case unless he had merited to preserve her from original sin. I prove it in three ways: first in comparison to God to whom he reconciles; second in comparison to the evil from which he liberates; third by comparison to the obligation of the person whom he reconciled.

19. [In comparison to God to whom he reconciles] - To see the first proof I set down an example in agreement with Anselm’s example in Why God Man 2.16: someone, when offending a king, injures the king so much that the king is offended in all the person’s natural sons and, being offended, disinherits him [and them] etc.; this offence is set down as not to be remitted unless someone innocent offers to the king some obedience that placates and pleases the king more than the sin was offensive to him; someone does offer an obedience thus pleasing, and reconciles the sons to the king so that they are not disinherited; yet the king is offended in each son, although he afterwards remits the offense because of the merits of the mediator. But if the mediator could supremely and most perfectly please the king, he would anticipate the king with respect to some son such that the king would not be offended in that son - for this would be greater than if the king remits now to the son an offense held against him; nor is this impossible, since the offense does not come from the son’s own guilt but was contracted from another.

20. From this example the argument goes as follows: no one supremely or most perfectly placates someone for someone’s contracting an offense unless he can prevent that someone from being offended in the other, for if he placates him so as to remit the offense when he is already offended, he does not most perfectly placate him; and indeed in the issue at hand God is not offended in the soul because of an interior motion in God himself, but only because of guilt in that very soul; therefore Christ does not most perfectly placate the Trinity for Adam’s sons contracting guilt if he does not prevent the Trinity from being offended in someone and if the soul of some son of Adam does not have such guilt - and consequently some soul of some son of Adam does not have such guilt, or it is possible that he not have the guilt.

21. [In comparison to the evil from which he liberates] - In the second way the argument is twofold:

First, because the most perfect mediator merits the removal of all punishment from him whom he reconciles; but original guilt is a greater punishment than the lack itself of the divine vision, as was made clear in 2 d.36 nn.170-173, because sin is for an intellectual nature the greatest of all its punishments;     therefore if Christ has most perfectly reconciled us to God, he merited to take away from someone this gravest of punishments - but not from anyone but his Mother, therefore etc     . This is confirmed by the example, because if the greatest punishment for a son of Adam were that the king was offended in him, no one would most perfectly reconcile him unless he took away from him not only his being disinherited but also his being an enemy of the king’s, etc.

22. In this same second way the argument proceeds secondly as follows: Christ seems more immediately to have been our repairer and reconciler from original sin than from actual sin, because the necessity for the incarnation and passion of Christ is commonly assigned to original sin [Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure, Aquinas, Richard of Middleton]; but it is commonly supposed [Albert the Great, Bonaventure, Aquinas, Peter of Tarentaise (Innocent V), Richard of Middleton] that Christ was a very perfect mediator of some person, to wit Mary, because he preserved her from all actual sin; therefore, similarly, he preserved her from original sin.

23. [In comparison to the obligation of the person whom he reconciled] - In the third way I argue as follows: a reconciled person is not supremely obliged to a mediator unless he have from him the highest good that can be had from him; but the innocence in question, namely preservation from contracted sin or from contracting sin, can be had through the mediator; therefore no person will be supremely bound to Christ as mediator if Christ preserved no one from original sin.

24. And if you say that a person to whom sin is remitted is [not?] equally as much bound as a person who is preserved from sin, because of the saying of Luke 7.47, ‘He who is forgiven more loves more’ - look at the response there of Augustine,Sermon 99 ch.6: “But O you who say that you did not commit many sins. Wherefore? Ruled by whom?... This man committed many and was made debtor for many; that man, being governed by God, committed few. The former attributes to God that he dismissed them; the latter attributes to God that he did not commit them... Recognize then the grace of him to whom you also owe that you did not commit them.” On Holy Virginity ch.41 n.41, “Reckon for yourselves as altogether dismissed by God all evil whatever that was - under his rule - not committed by you.” ⁴² that all non-committed sins are dismissed as if they were committed sins; indeed, it is a more excellent kindness to preserve from evil than to allow to fall into evil and to liberate from it afterwards.

25. It seems too that, when Christ merited grace and glory for many souls, and when these souls are debtors to Christ for grace and glory as to their mediator, why will there be no soul a debtor to him for innocence? And why, although all the blessed angels are innocent, will no human soul in the fatherland be innocent save Christ’s soul alone?

b. Against the Second Reason

26. The second reason [n.15], which was taken from what is evident in Mary, does not seem conclusive:

For what is argued first, about infection of the flesh on account of begetting from seed, does not proceed according to Anselm’s way of original sin, as was touched on in 2. d.30 nn.30-32, 48-67 [Anselm holds that original sin is lack of owed original justice]. Or, given that commonly original sin is thus contracted [sc. from infection of flesh, as held by Lombard et al.], yet the infection of flesh - which remains after baptism - is not a necessary cause that original sin remain in the soul but, while the infection remains, original sin is destroyed because of the grace conferred on the soul; thus God could destroy the infection in the first instance of the Virgin’s conception by then giving her grace, so that there would be no necessary cause of infection in her soul but grace would take away the guilt in her soul.

27. The other point, about the sufferings of Mary [n.16], is not conclusive; for the mediator can so reconcile someone that penalties useless to him are taken away from him and he is left in penalties useful to him; original guilt would not have been useful to Mary; temporal penalties were useful to her, because in them she earned merit;     therefore etc     .

B. Scotus’ own Response

28. As to the question I say that God could have acted so that Mary had never been in original sin; he could also have acted so that she was in sin only at one instant [Henry of Ghent, infra n.30]; he could also have acted so that she was in sin for some time and was purged in the last instant of that time [the common opinion, nn.14-16].

29. I clarify the first: since grace is equivalent to original justice as concerns divine acceptation, so that - because of it - original sin is not in a soul possessed of grace, God could in the first instant of the soul have poured into it as much grace as he poured into another soul at circumcision or baptism; therefore in its first instant the soul would not have had original sin, just as neither would it have had original sin afterwards when the person was baptized. And if the infection of the flesh was there in the first instant, it was not a necessary cause of infection in the soul, just as neither was it after baptism when - according to many [Lombard et al, see Scotus Ord. 2 dd.30-34 nn.29, 33] - it remains and the infection in the soul does not remain; or the flesh could have been cleansed before the infusion of the soul, so that in that instant the soul was not infected.

30. The second [n.28, Henry of GhentQuodlibet 15 q.13, “Was it possible, according to nature, that the Virgin, in the instant in which she was conceived a human being from seed according to the body and in which the soul was united to the body, could truly have contracted original sin and remained in the sin only for that instant? And it seems to me that this is very well possible... When a fava bean is moved upwards with violent motion and meets something moved more forcefully, to wit a millstone falling naturally downwards, it is, by the sudden contact of the stone, altered in an instant into a space equal thereto by the natural motion of the stone pushing the fava bean downwards, so that it is not possible for the fava bean to rest in a space equal to itself in the way it would have rested if it were left to itself. And this example, as it seems to me, is valid.for our present purpose: for the corporeal human form has being.in the first moment of its generation from the seed., and in the same instant the human body.has infected being.; and in the same instant the rational soul is created in the body...and thereby the soul contracts from the body the stain of original sin.; and in the whole preceding time the soul did not have that stain, because it did not have being; nor did [the stain] have being in the Virgin during the subsequent time, as I reckon becomes the dignity of the Virgin, in the way it is possible according to nature, so that only in passing and in an instant was she in original sin; that is to say, original sin had in that instant first and final being at once, but according to different indications of that instant, because as the instant was the term of past time, original sin had in it first being., but as the instant was the beginning of subsequent time, original sin had in it final being by the subsequent impulse of the motion of grace, as by a superior expelling original sin in that subsequent time. Thus it seems to me that original sin could have been in the Virgin for the sole moment of an instant. But whether it so happened God knows - and I neither know it nor assert it, but it seems reasonable to me and possible that, in accord with the aforesaid, it did happen.” ⁴³] is plain, because a natural agent can begin to act in an instant such that in that instant it will have been at rest under one contrary and in the immediate time it is in a state of becoming under the contrary form; but whenever a natural agent can act, God can act; therefore he can cause grace in the time immediate to some instant. There is also confirmation of this because, when the soul is in sin, it can, by divine power, be in grace; but in the time when the Virgin was conceived she could have been in sin and, for you [Henry], she was; therefore likewise she could have been in grace.

31. Nor was it then necessary that she would have been in grace in the first instant of the time, just as neither was this necessary in the case of alteration and motion [n.30 footnote].

32. Further, if God had created grace in the first instant, the third member [n.30] could be there posited, and God could have conserved this grace in the immediate time.

33. The third [n.28] is manifest.

34. But as to which one happened among these three that have been shown to be possible, God knows; but if it not be repugnant to the authority of the Church or to the authority of Scripture, then to attribute to Mary the more excellent seems probable.

C. Objections and their Solution

35. Against the third of these members [n.32] there is a twofold objection:

First as follows: whatever God does immediately in respect of some creature he does in an instant, because (Physics 8.10.266b4-5) an infinite power acts in an instant, for a finite and an infinite power cannot act with equal measure; therefore God cannot, after the instant of guilt, justify the soul through grace in the immediate time.

36. Further, was the justification a motion or was it an alteration? Not an alteration because it would not happen in an instant. Not motion because there would be no succession according to parts of the movable thing, namely of the soul, because the soul is indivisible; nor according to parts of the form, namely of grace; nor according to means between extremes, for there is no mean between privative opposites in respect of a naturally fit subject, just as there is absolutely none between contradictories; nor is one of these opposites acquired or lost part by part; nor is the subject divisible.

37. To the first objection [n.35] I say that if God voluntarily, and not necessarily, acts in an instant of some time, he must wait for the ‘then’ so that he may act in a determinate instant of the time; but he can act in a time in whose first instant he did not act; it is therefore true that God can do in an instant what he does immediately, but it is not necessary for him to act in an instant.

38. To the second [n.36] I say that, when speaking strictly about motion and alteration in the way the Philosopher does [cf. d.2 n.117 supra], passive justification is neither motion nor alteration but has something of both: from alteration it has that it is in a subject as a simple and indivisible form; from time and motion it has that it is in no indivisible measure but is in time, and in this respect it fails of being alteration. But it fails of being motion because it is not a flow according to the parts of the form and of the movable thing, or according to means between extremes, for here there are no means, as was proved [n.36].

39. Here is an example of this: a movable thing passes from the form under which it was in the ultimate instant of rest in such a way that, after that instant, there is a continuous losing of the form according to its parts and a continuous acquiring of the opposite form. If the opposite form were present in the whole time then, since its parts would not be acquired successively, it would be like the issue at hand, because then the acquiring of the form would be neither motion nor alteration, just as the passage now from alteration to motion is neither alteration nor motion.

40. But why is an undergoing caused by a natural agent an alteration or a motion but this is not?

I reply that if a natural agent can introduce a form suddenly, it introduces it through alteration; and if it cannot, it must act in time and so through motion and so by moving. But God, although he can introduce a form in an instant, yet - if he were not to introduce it in an instant - he can introduce the whole of it in time such that he does not introduce it part after part; for being able to act in time is not a mark of imperfection in an agent, although the necessity of acting in time is an imperfection.